Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 206 Seiten: 13-35.

The recent global outspread of the COVID-19 pandemic has influenced the lives of people across multiple countries including athletes, coaches, and supporting staff. Along with everybody else, coaches found themselves constrained to an at-home self-isolation, which limited their ability to normally engage with their profession and to interact with their athletes. This situation may also have impacted their own psychological well-being. With this study, we explored coaches’ perceptions of stress in relation to their emotion regulation strategies depending upon their gender (...) and competitive level. A sample of 2272 Italian coaches were surveyed during the period of lockdown. Mean values for perceived stress and emotion regulation strategies were compared to normative data of the two instruments as reported in the original studies. Furthermore, two Multivariate analyses of variance were completed to observe the potential differences in the coaches’ emotion regulation strategies and perception of stress. Finally, a blockwise regression analysis was run to assess how coaches’ emotion regulation strategies impacted upon their perception of stress. Both women and men reported higher levels of perceived stress than those reported in the normative data. Similarly, average scores for emotion regulation strategies were significantly different from those reported for normative data, in particular, coaches reported slightly higher use of emotion regulation strategies than participants in the original study. Significant gender-based differences emerged in terms of emotional regulations, with men adopting more suppression than women. No differences by competitive level were found. In terms of perceived stress, male coaches and elite coaches showed to be more in control of the situation than female coaches and non-elite coaches, respectively, while women experienced more negative stress than men. The blockwise regression evidenced how reappraisal resulted to be predictive in helping coaches to reduce their perception of stress, while suppression predicted higher stress perceptions. (shrink)

When we use secure computer systems, we engage with carefully orchestrated and ordered interactions called “security ceremonies”, all of which exist to assure security. A great deal of attention has been paid to improving the usability of these ceremonies over the last two decades, to make them easier for end-users to engage with. Yet, usability improvements do not seem to have endeared end users to ceremonies. As a consequence, human actors might subvert the ceremony’s processes or avoid engaging with it. (...) Here, we consider whether beautification could be one way of making ceremonies more appealing. To explore beautification in this context, we carried out three studies. Study 1 surveyed 250 participants to derive a wide range of potential dimensions of “beautiful ceremonies”. These statements were sorted into dominant themes and converted into statements, which fed into the second study, with 309 respondents, to reveal the dominant dimensions constituting beauty. Study 3 asked 41 participants to carry out a Q-sort, which revealed the ways that people combine the identified dimensions when characterising security ceremonies as “beautiful”. These studies have allowed us to pin down the perceived dimensions of beauty in the context of security ceremonies, and also to understand how people combine these dimensions in different ways in judging security ceremonies to be beautiful, confirming the old adage of beauty being “in the eye of the beholder”. We conclude by highlighting the constraints imposed by the overarching requirement for security to be maintained in the face of any usability improvements and beautification endeavours. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 213 Seiten: 123-164.

In the end of the section 219a 10-21 of the 11th chapter of Physics IV Aristotle defines the ‘before and after’ in movement as follows: «The ‘before and after’ in motion is identical ὅ ποτε ὂυ with motion, yet differs from it τò εἶυατ αύτῷ, and is not identical with motion t (11. 19-21)». These lines convey the answer to the question whether the ‘before’ and after’ are the same thing as movement or not: in one sense, ὅ ποτε ὂυ, (...) they are, in another sense, τò εἶυαι, they are not. But, first and foremost, the opposition of ὅ ποτε ὂυ to то τò εἶυαι is very useful to Aristotle to solve the main aporia of the chapter about the contradictory – at a first sight – and concurrent diversity and identity of the instant, τò υῠυ. Therefore, this aporia will be solved, if only ὅ ποτε ὂυ and то τò εἶυαι mean two really opposing points of view. But what are these points of view? What do they really mean? As it is well known, the phrase ὅ ποτε ὂυ is one of the most enigmatic in the Aristotelian corpus, and yet one of the most important in his physical research because concerns the nature and definition of time. The lower was the agreement among the scholars, with greater force the debate has flared up. An alternative way for attempting to successfully tackle the problem is take in consideration the occurrence of the same phrase in other works than Physica, since the other occurrences of it in the 11th and 14th chapter of the same book are of no help. It is present in only two other works: On Generation and Corruption, I, 3, 319b 3 and Parts of Animals, II, 2, 649a 15; II, 3, 649b 24. In both works we are led to take ὅ ποτε ὂυ as being associated to such terms as ύποκεἰμενον and ύπóκειται. So, Aristotle seems to point out a contrast between a formal respect and a material respect by the opposition of τò εἶυαι to ὅ ποτε ὂυ. The reading of all passages from Physics – particularly, 219a 20-21 – wherein ὅ ποτε ὂυ occurs provides further confirmation of this contrast. As matter of fact, in all three works τò εἶυαι was employed by Aristotle for the same purpose: to set out the difference between a substratum of its own and its ability to actually exist just as substratum underlying worldly things. This difference implies that a substratum cannot but be limited by or relating to time. A condition which is emphasized by the presence of the term ποτε. In conclusion, each instant comes out from the division by the ‘before and after’ of movement’s substratum. If this substratum is found to exist in time, the ‘before and after’ turns out to be ‘what that is now and then’ (ὅ ποτε ὂυ), which, reversely, is the same as the ‘before and after’ in the movement. The occurrences of the incomplete phrase (as ὅ ποτε plus other verbal voices than ὂυ) in other works substantiate this view. (shrink)

Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's ' moral twin earth argument' raises doubts about the naturalistic realist's ability to make sense of genuine disagreement. I offer three arguments the realist's behalf. First, I argue that the example at the heart of their argument is underdescribed; when fully developed, it loses its intuitive force. Second, I suggest that taking the stipulations of the Horgan-Timmons example seriously gives us reason to revise our initial judgments. Third, I propose combining naturalistic realism about moral judgments (...) with expressivism about the last ought before action in order to preserve the conflict between moralists and twin -moralists. (shrink)

This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments from other sorts of assessment and thus for identifying narrowly (...) moral disagreements. If they do, we can construct cases of intuitively real dispute that do not rest on the theory's preferred mental states. This strategy is possible because our intuitions about moral concept-ascription do not track speakers' noncognitive states. I discuss various ways of developing this basic argument, then apply it to the work of the two most sophisticated proponents of expressivism, Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn. I argue that neither is successful in meeting the challenge. (shrink)

During a Barolo en primeur tasting session, a seasoned wine taster is assailed by a procedural unease which leads him to question the foundations on which his work rests. Sparked off by his reading of Michel Le Gris’ pamphlet Dionysos crucifié, the taster’s objections and perplexities are directed towards teasing out the rules and coordinates of a tasting aesthetic which has become tamed and domesticated, at the service of a narcissistic “tyranny of instant gratification”. Such an approach translates into wines (...) that are beaten into submission by interventionist winemakers, wines that derive from a tasting model that has been pre-emptively cleansed of tension or dissonance so as to exalt products that are easy, reassuring, docile to marketing logic, and increasingly similar. What sort of doubts, what interpretative friction can hope to reacquaint wine criticism with its true and original aims? What relations between the tongue that tastes and the tongue that speaks can respond to the needs of a new approach to wine appreciation, a ‘tasting different’? (shrink)

This paper argues that expressivism faces serious difficulties giving an adequate account of univocal moral disagreements. Expressivist accounts of moral discourse understand moral judgments in terms of various noncognitive mental states, and they interpret moral disagreements as clashes between competing attitudes. I argue that, for various reasons, expressivists must specify just what mental states are involved in moral judgment. If they do not, we lack a way of distinguishing moral judgments from other sorts of assessment and thus for identifying narrowly (...) moral disagreements. If they do, we can construct cases of intuitively real dispute that do not rest on the theory’s preferred mental states. This strategy is possible because our intuitions about moral concept-ascription do not track speakers’ noncognitive states. I discuss various ways of developing this basic argument, then apply it to the work of the two most sophisticated proponents of expressivism, Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn. I argue that neither is successful in meeting the challenge. (shrink)

Can failure be aesthetic or artistic? How can failure be described as an aesthetic phenomenon or as a work of art? Starting from a concept of aesthetic experience and presence this paper seeks answers to said question in four steps. After defining the event ›failure‹ (I), its aesthetic potential is determined (II), and distinguished from failure as art and the artfulness of failure (III). Finally, the significance of the aesthetic experience of failure for its existential understanding is examined (IV).

Aristotle�s account on natural slavery is neither misleading nor paradoxical, but plausible even though controversial, unlike many commentators think of. On his view natural masters are essentially the virtuous people, viz. those who have been perfected in their process of growing, and natural slaves are essentially the vicious people, viz. those who have been injured or corrupted in some way in their growing up so as to suffer from a lack of autonomous practical rationality. Of course, many barbarians are in (...) this state, but there is no need to presume that all of them are. More to the point, some Greeks will be in this state, especially the many and he who the many have a high regard for. Because of this state, slavery is for the better allowing a slave�s life to become more worthwhile as an instrumental part of the master�s living a good life. Particularly, nature requires that some humans will be able to attain happiness some other will not. Masters and slaves are linked through the rational pursuit of happiness by the political community where they play different roles but equally required. Thus, master and slave will form a single system whose working unity does confirm that a clear separation between that which dominates and that is being dominated must always take place for natural things to be according the best standard. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, EarlyView.

Mein Beitrag versteht den Werkbegriff nicht nur als ästhetischen, sondern auch als epistemischen Grundbegriff. Ausgehend von einem nachgelassenen Fragment Friedrich Nietzsches, das Eingang in Der Wille zur Macht – einen Text mit prekärem Werkstatus – gefunden hat, wird in drei Schritten argumentiert: (1) Der Werkbegriff ist an verschiedenen Prozeduren in den Geisteswissenschaften beteiligt und bleibt auch dann erhalten, wenn ein werkästhetischer Werkbegriff abgelehnt wird. (2) Innerhalb dieser Prozeduren kommt dem Werkbegriff eine gemeinsame Funktion zu. Sie besteht in der Konstitution epistemischer (...) Dinge. Die Ähnlichkeit der Prozeduren des Werkbegriffs in den Geisteswissenschaften kann mit dieser Beschreibung auch über methodische und disziplinäre Grenzen hinweg beschrieben werden. (3) Der Wille zur Macht wird auch für kulturelle bzw. kulturökonomische Zwecke in Dienst genommen. Der Werkbegriff ist ein Grenzbegriff über die Wissenschaft hinaus. Er bildet boundary objects. (shrink)

‘Nomofanie’ sta per “manifestazioni del nómos”. Nel libro si presentano configurazioni concettuali, problemi teoretici e contesti empirici che sono altrettanti dispositivi nomofanici, cioè produttivi di varie e molteplici manifestazioni di quel nómos che la filosofia del diritto è chiamata ad indagare. Quattro i filosofi più richiamati: Aristotele, Tommaso d’Aquino, Kant e Hegel, che costituiscono una sorta di “quadratura” per pensare alcune questioni critiche del vivere-insieme anche nelle società presenti.

In this essay, I attempt to interpret the educational philosophy of John Dewey in a way that accomplishes two goals. The first of these is to avoid any reference to Dewey as a propagator of a particular scientific method or to any of the individualist and cognitivist ideas that is sometimes associated with him. Secondly, I want to overcome the tendency to interpret Dewey as a naturalist by looking at his concept of intelligence. It is argued that ‘intelligent experience’ is (...) the basic concept of education. I suggest how this concept should be understood. I propose to look at it as an interplay between the faculties of imagination and judgment. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to interpret the educational philosophy of John Dewey in a way that accomplishes two goals. The first of these is to avoid any reference to Dewey as a propagator of a particular scientific method or to any of the individualist and cognitivist ideas that is sometimes associated with him. Secondly, I want to overcome the tendency to interpret Dewey as a naturalist by looking at his concept of intelligence. It is argued that ‘intelligent experience’ is (...) the basic concept of education. I suggest how this concept should be understood. I propose to look at it as an interplay between the faculties of imagination and judgment. (shrink)

Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our (...) moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to share moral concepts. (shrink)

In this essay it is argued that the educational philosophy of John Dewey gains in depth and importance by being related to his philosophy of nature, his metaphysics. The result is that any experiental process is situated inside an event, an existence, a thing, and I try to interpret this “thing” as schools or major cultural events such as the French revolution. This basic view is correlated to Dewey’s concept of transaction, of experience and finally, it is related to a (...) discussion of methods in education. (shrink)

In much theory there is a tendency to place thought above action, or the opposite, action over thought. The consequence of the first option is that philosophy or scientific evidence gains the upper hand in educational thinking. The consequence of the second view is that pragmatism and relativism become the dominant features. This article discusses how different branches of the Aristotelian tradition can mediate between these two views. I argue, contrary to some other Aristotelian approaches, that thinking and action are (...) both separated and yet prerequisites for each other and point to some educational consequences of this way of thinking. To build this argument I draw on selected aspects of the philosophy of Hanna Arendt, Leo Strauss and John Dewey. (shrink)

This article presents a discussion of how postmodernist, poststructuralist and critical educational thinking relate to different theories of power. I argue that both Critical Theory and some poststructuralist ideas base themselves on a concept of power borrowed from a modernist tradition. I argue as well that we are better off combining a postmodern idea of education with a postmodern idea of power. To this end the concept of power presented by the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe is introduced. (...) This concept controverts a number of major educational concepts, i.e. concepts such as causality, autonomy, subjectivity and originality. In other words, it allows us to take a fresh look at old concepts. Finally, I relate the discussion to a number of recent theories of learning. (shrink)

The “therapeutic obligation” is a physician’s duty to provide his patients with what he believes is the best available treatment. We begin by discussing some prominent formulations of the obligation before raising two related considerations against those formulations. First, they do not make sense of cases where doctors are permitted to provide suboptimal care. Second, they give incorrect results in cases where doctors are choosing treatments in challenging epistemic environments. We then propose and defend an account of the therapeutic obligation (...) that solves the problems that undermined previous efforts at formulating the TO. We conclude by considering how apparent problems with our proposal actually rest on difficulties with informed consent. (shrink)